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Central banks may soon issue currencies that are entirely digital (CBDCs) and possibly interest-bearing. A strategic analytical framework is used to investigate this
innovation in the laboratory, contrasting a traditional “plain” tokens baseline to
treatments with “sophisticated” interest-bearing tokens. In the experiment, this
theoretically beneﬁcial innovation precluded the emergence of a stable monetary
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Introduction

Many central banks are considering issuing currency in an entirely digital form,
known as CBDC (Boar et al., 2020; Camera, 2017). The goal is to replace or
complement coins and banknotes—the sovereign monetary instruments that
currently support retail payments. An intriguing feature of proposed CBDCs is
the possibility of yielding negative or positive interest (Cœuré and Loh, 2018).
This would mark a sharp departure from the Central Bank currencies we are
used to, which historically carried no interest.1 The possible ramiﬁcations
of issuing an interest-bearing digital currency have not been systematically
studied, and several questions remain open. In particular: Would their introduction aﬀect the stability and performance of the currency system? What
problems might emerge that standard theory does not foresee?
This study reports results of an experiment that investigates how allocative eﬃciency supported by the exchange of tokens depends on the ﬂow payoﬀ
from holding tokens. It documents outcomes observed in laboratory economies
where a “sophisticated” interest-bearing token replaces or complements a “plain”
token. Both instruments are peer-to-peer, with the former representing a
CBDC and the latter a traditional Central Bank currency instrument. The
design leverages the strategic analytical framework developed in Camera and
Casari (2014), which captures general operating principles underlying mone1

Central Bank currency should not be confused with bank deposits, denominated in the
same unit and typically carrying an interest. Unlike Central Bank currencies, deposits are
(i) private forms of money representing a claim on private debt not on the Central Bank,
(ii) their exchange is not peer-to-peer but is intermediated, and (iii) support wholesale
payments, while cash is primarily used for retail payments. An interest-paying sovereign
currency could improve business cycles stabilization and, if issued to substitute cash, could
remove the zero lower bound constraint on nominal interest rates (e.g., Bordo and Levin,
2017). A CBDC could also raise payments systems’ eﬃciency by reducing the costly layers
of ﬁnancial institutions that support the processing and settlement of electronic payments,
and could improve the speed and eﬃcacy of intervention through the monetary transmission
channel. See for instance Broadbent (2016); Skingsley (2016).
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tary models, easily adapts to experimental investigation, and has a replicable
baseline performance (Bigoni et al., 2020).
The design involves economies consisting of eight individuals who interact
in random pairs. In each pair one person can produce a consumption good
for the other. Incentives to produce exist because consumption beneﬁts dominate production costs and economic roles alternate over time, indeﬁnitely.
According to standard theory, these economies can support a socially eﬃcient
intertemporal exchange of goods. Pareto-inferior equilibria also exist, with partial or even no production at all. To facilitate eﬃcient play, initial consumers
are endowed with a ﬁxed supply of tokens with no intrinsic or redemption
value, and no link to outside currencies—i.e., “plain” tokens. If participants
spontaneously trade production for a token, then a monetary system emerges
where tokens acquire value as payment instruments—a ﬁat currency is born.
This baseline condition is contrasted to treatments with “sophisticated” tokens that can yield small payoﬀs, positive or negative, i.e, are interest-bearing.
Several economies are studied: with just one type of token, two types of tokens, or where a plain tokens endowment is replaced by sophisticated ones. By
design, using tokens as a money can support eﬃcient play in all treatments,
though it is not necessary as a non-monetary strategy can also achieve that
goal. Theoretically, making tokens interest-bearing should not degrade economic performance and, in fact, a positive interest should make tokens more
attractive, facilitating the emergence of a monetary system. This and other
hypotheses are tested with the data collected in the laboratory.
The analysis reveals that moving away from zero-interest tokens stunted
the spontaneous development of a monetary system, preventing coordination
on eﬃcient play and lowering payoﬀs. This is not what standard theory would
predict. To explain, all treatments reveal a strongly positive association be3

tween the frequency of monetary trade and realized eﬃciency. When a monetary system did not develop, or was poorly functioning, participants simply
did not produce for others—which corroborates earlier ﬁndings (Camera et
al., 2013). A novel result is that while participants learned to exchange plain
tokens for production, this did not occur with sophisticated tokens. Giving
tokens a small positive interest shifted subjects’ focus away from trying to attain large long-run payoﬀs by trading tokens, to securing low but predictable
gains by hoarding tokens. This myopic behavior created illiquidity, preventing
tokens’ circulation and the development of a viable monetary system. Giving
tokens a small negative yield sharply reduced their acceptability and, hence,
their value as payment instruments.
This study makes two broad contributions. From a substantive perspective, it demonstrates that theoretically beneﬁcial institutions may prove to
be empirically harmful. Our laboratory economies performed best in a zerointerest rate environment. This provides useful information for Central Banks
considering digital currencies with interest-bearing features under their control. The experiment suggests that a currency instrument performs better
when it is unencumbered by valuation aspects that go beyond the meansof-payments role. Small intrinsic values of interest-bearing tokens distorted
decision-making, fostering myopic conduct that reduced subjects’ appreciation
for the large potential extrinsic value of tokens as a medium of exchange.
From a methodological perspective, the study brings to light the advantage
of combining theoretical with experimental investigation to provide insights
that may help planning and decisions of policymakers (Smith, 1994). The
experiment suggests that Central Banks pursuing currency innovation can gain
valuable insights from studying economic behavior in the laboratory. This
contributes to a growing body of knowledge showing that exploring behavioral
4

angles can improve overall policy assessment (Armantier and Holt, 2019; Duﬀy
and Heinemann, 2020). This does not imply that one should mechanically
extrapolate from the experimental results policy recommendations applicable
to ﬁeld economies. Laboratory economies are not designed to be exact replicas
of ﬁeld economies, nor is the theory on which they are based, so elements
crucial to calibrate a speciﬁc ﬁeld situation may be missing. For instance,
consider the possible use of interest-rate bearing CBDCs to stabilize business
cycles. The naturally occurring price and income dynamics of ﬁeld economics
are not present in the laboratory economies studied here. This precludes an
inﬂation-output tradeoﬀ to arise in the experiment—the traditional theoretical
channel motivating interest-rate policy interventions. It is entirely possible
that a richer design accounting for inﬂation-output trade-oﬀs could make an
interest-paying CBDC superior to a traditional “barren” currency instrument.
The study proceeds by situating the experiment in the extant literature
(Section 2), discussing the design (Section 3) and providing a theoretical reference (Section 4). Results from the analysis of the experimental data are in
Section 5, while Section 6 oﬀers some ﬁnal considerations.

2

Contribution to the experimental literature

One can classify existing designs of laboratory monetary economies based on
whether monetary trade is taken as a primitive or not, and what objects can
serve as a currency instrument; see Table 1. Typically, experiments study
traditional ﬁat monetary systems and commodity money. This experiment
widens the focus to study the performance of possible alternatives to traditional currencies—for which Central Banks have obvious ﬁeld data limitations.
In early experiments, monetary trade was taken as a primitive, meaning
5

that participants must trade with a pre-deﬁned instrument to earn income
(e.g., Marimon and Sunder, 1993). Camera and Casari (2014) and Camera
et al. (2013) innovated with a design based on a game-theoretic framework
where monetary trade emerges spontaneously, being neither imposed nor necessary to maximize payoﬀs. Here, we build on that second strand of literature by considering digital tokens that are more sophisticated than traditional
currencies—the intrinsically useless objects that are typically studied in the
laboratory (Duﬀy and Puzzello, 2014; Huber et al., 2014; Hirota et al., 2020).
Table 1: Contribution to the experimental literature on money.
Monetary trade
is externally imposed

Monetary trade
emerges spontaneously

Plain tokens, goods

✓

✓

Sophisticated tokens

✓

unexplored

To give some context, this study is part of a wider research agenda investigating possible links between the emergence of monetary systems, market organization, and economic development. In particular, it is related to
three recent articles about how monetary systems aﬀect the endogenous size
of trading groups (Bigoni et al., 2019), the performance of reputation systems
relative to monetary systems (Bigoni et al., 2020), and the competition between synchronous and asynchronous trading systems (Camera et al., 2020).2
Our design pushes this research frontier forward by focusing on the impact
2

A main diﬀerence between commodity-based and token-based currency systems is that
the former crowds out consumption (commodities serving the role of money cannot be
consumed or used in production) while the latter does not (tokens are symbolic objects
without alternative practical uses). Object-speciﬁc costs (holding, exchange or transportation costs) do not alter this consideration.

6

of currency innovation on economic organization. We consider sophisticated
tokens that are theoretically preferable relative to traditional currency instruments, as holding them yields a direct beneﬁt. However, monetary trade is
not imposed as a necessary mechanism to generate income: alternatives to
monetary exchange exist. This sets the experiment apart from those few on
the theme of currency innovation, which all preclude alternatives to monetary
exchange. In Camera et al. (2003), buyers must choose between spending cash
or a dividend-bearing perpetuity, in Camera et al. (2016) traders must choose
between a plain cash instrument or a better-performing electronic money, and
similarly in Arifovic et al. (2021). The advantage of our design is it neither
takes monetary exchange as a primitive nor imposes it as a pre-requisite for
income-maximization. Monetary exchange supports maximum welfare but is
unnecessary to attain it since alternative non-monetary strategies exist that
support eﬃcient play. The following section clariﬁes how this is done.

3

Design of the experiment

Monetary theory stipulates that rational individuals choose to organize their
economic activities to maximize the possible gains from trade. The experimental design reﬂects this principle and makes explicit the trading process, and
builds on Camera and Casari (2014). An economy consists of eight players
who interact for an indeﬁnite number of rounds (or, periods). Half are consumers, half are producers, and everyone switches role in every round as in a
Turnpike (Townsend, 1980). In the baseline treatment, every initial consumer
is endowed with one plain “token,” a riskless electronic object that has no
intrinsic value, is indivisible, and can be exchanged peer-to-peer. Tokens have
no reference to outside currencies, cannot be redeemed for points or cash, and
7

cannot be disposed of so their supply of four units is stable. Subjects are free
to use or ignore tokens so that whether or not tokens circulate and become a
valuable currency in the experiment is endogenous.
A round of play. Interactions are in random producer-consumer pairs. Every round, each pair faces the game in Table 2. The producer has a good that
both players beneﬁt from eating: d = 6 points for the producer and g = 15
for the consumer. The producer determines who gets the good, and so has the
full power to decide size and distribution of earnings in the pair. We say that
there is cooperation if the consumer eats the good, and defection otherwise.
Table 2: The stage game in a meeting where the consumer has tokens.
Producer
D

C

Sell

Idle

3, 6

Spend

3, 6

15, 0
T
⃝
15, 0

3, 6
T
⃝
15, 0

Consumer

T = token exchanged from consumer
Notes: Payoﬀs to Consumer, Producer, in points. ⃝
to producer. Monetary trade occurs when Sell and Spend are selected. The shaded cells
refer to the restricted game if monetary trade is impossible (the consumer has no token).
Neutral language described choices in the experiment (see Instructions in Supp. Mat.).

Table 2 shows outcomes as a function of actions in the pair. The producer
can always transfer the good to his counterpart (C for “cooperate”), or eat it
(D for “defect”); if the consumer has tokens, the producer can also oﬀer to
exchange the good for one token (Sell). Consumers with tokens can oﬀer one
for the producer’s good (Spend) or take no action (Idle). Consumers without
tokens have no action to take: the outcome depends on the producer’s D or C
8

choice (shaded cells). Possession of tokens is known to counterparts, but not
the exact amount, to preclude identiﬁcation and reputation-building.
Players move simultaneously—hence, cannot signal cooperative intentions
by oﬀering or requesting tokens. Token exchange is peer-to-peer and quidpro-quo. That is, no intermediary is needed to settle a trade, and exchange
takes the form of a direct mechanism in which each pair of choices leads to
a unique outcome. If choices are mutually compatible, then good and token
T in Table 2), and otherwise players keep their
change hands (indicated by ⃝

inventory.3 Token holdings are unrestricted, so a subject can hold as little as
zero and at most four tokens (the entire supply). Subjects see the outcome
and the counterpart’s action at the end of the meeting.
A consumer exiting a meeting without a good earns d − l = 3 points (n the
experiment 1 point = USD 0.15 ), while a producer in a similar situation earns
a = 0 points. Total earnings in a pair are 15 or 9 points, depending on who
consumes (consumer or producer). Hence, producers can create a 6-points
surplus by giving their good to consumers. Token exchange is unnecessary
to create this surplus as the distribution of tokens in the pair neither aﬀects
the payoﬀ matrix, nor prevents the selection of C. Given the payoﬀ structure,
self-interested producers must have a prospect of future consumption to be
willing to give up their good. This dynamic prospect is discussed next.
Supergame and session. An economy lasts 16 rounds plus an uncertain
number of additional rounds. From round 16, at the end of each round there
is probability β = 0.75 of another round, and a 0.25 probability of the economy ending, using a computer’s random draw from a uniform probability dis3

Limiting the exchange to one token simpliﬁes subjects’ cognitive task and ﬁxes the price of
tokens, removing speculative motives for exchange. Producers can prevent a token transfer
by choosing D, which matters in the treatment where holding tokens creates losses.
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tribution. The initial 16 rounds ensure a basic common experience across
treatments and sessions, while the random termination prevents the end-ofgame eﬀects operative under deterministic ending rules (Roth and Murnighan,
1978). We refer to an uncertain sequence of 16+ rounds as a supergame.
With each new round, players change roles and are randomly rematched
with uniform probability. This makes them “strangers” because they cannot
communicate with each other, identify counterparts and scrutinize their past
actions. This precludes reputation or reciprocity mechanisms.4 At the end of
the round, players are informed about the number of cooperative outcomes in
the entire economy. Each session includes 24 players arranged in three distinct
economies, which start and end simultaneously. When they end, three new
economies are created. This process is repeated ﬁve times, rematching session
participants into new economies so that no-one can meet counterparts from a
previous economy. This minimizes dynamic spillover eﬀects, and is known to
subjects. Overall, a session generates data for 15 economies, with each subject
participating in ﬁve diﬀerent economies.
Treatments. The payoﬀ structure of Table 2 is common to all treatments,
which diﬀer either in the tokens’ type or supply (or both); see Table 3. In some
treatments, holding a token at the start of a round creates a small gain or loss
denoted u (in points). A token is plain if u = 0 and sophisticated, otherwise.
In the baseline Fiat treatment, tokens are plain, and there is a constant 4 unit
supply (one per initial consumer). The treatments Penalty, Reward, and
Reward2 consider sophisticated tokens with small ﬂow payoﬀs u = −1, 1, 2,

4

This restriction is standard in the theory of money, introduced by assuming inﬁnite populations and private histories. For a conceptual discussion see the model economies in Lucas
(1984) and Townsend (1980); for a technical discussion see Kocherlakota 1998.
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respectively.5 We call u the interest paid by tokens.
Table 3: Treatments.
Interest u
Treatments
Main
Fiat
Reward
Reward2
Penalty
Additional
Fiat2
Mix
Switch

Token

Token

Other Token Supply

0
1
2
-1

—
—
—
—

4
4
4
4

0
0
0 then E[u] =1

0
2
—

4+4
4+4
4

Three additional treatments alter the supply of tokens. In Fiat2, the supply of plain tokens doubles to two per initial consumer; here the game is still
represented by Table 2. The Mix treatment alters the token supply composition by endowing initial consumers with one plain and one sophisticated token
u = 2; this expands the action sets of Table 2 adding one choice per player
(use one token, or use the other). This is described in Appendix A, Section
A.1, where further details about the design and experimental procedures are
also found. Finally, in Switch the ﬁrst two supergames are as is in Fiat,
while plain tokens are replaced in later supergames by tokens that pay 1 point
per round on average (either 0 or 2 points based on a computer-generated coin
ﬂip).6 Because −l < u < l, total payoﬀs in a pair are positive in all treatments
since 2d − l + u > 2(d − l) > 0.
5

A design where u is paid in tokens generates an unstable token supply (unlike the Fiat
baseline), distorting economic incentives for monetary trade (the “liquidity” value of tokens
as medium of exchange), and also adding unnecessary complexity to the experiment.
6
Subjects were informed that the ﬁrst two supergames involved plain “white tickets,” which
would be replaced by fancier “yellow tickets” described in detail before supergame 3.
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4

A theoretical reference

Our setup captures two key aspects of the theory of money: (i) money enables
an intertemporal reallocation of consumption that beneﬁts everyone but is
diﬃcult to accomplish due to trade frictions; (ii) monetary exchange is not
imposed and, as alternative non-monetary arrangements are also possible, it
emerges endogenously as an optimal response to trade frictions.
In the experiment a strategy exists that supports the eﬃcient allocation
and is not based on using of tokens as a money, i.e., the playing ﬁeld is theoretically level. To demonstrate this, let payoﬀ denote earnings expected ex-ante
(start of supergame). Payoﬀs depend on the player’s choices, those of future
opponents, and tokens’ ﬂow payoﬀ u. Two reference payoﬀs are associated
with the eﬃcient or full cooperation outcome, when producers never consume,
and autarky or full defection, where only producers consume. Recalling the
stage game payoﬀs deﬁnitions g = 15, d = 6, l = 3, a = 0, autarky payoﬀs to
initial producers and consumers are
v̂p :=

d + β(d − l)
1 − β2

and

v̂c :=

u + d − l + β(d + u)
.
1 − β2

Here, the tokens’ ﬂow payoﬀ u aﬀects only initial consumers, as tokens never
change hands. Autarky is a subgame perfect equilibrium because D is always
a best response to everyone playing D. How can we support eﬃcient play?
A non-monetary arrangement for eﬃcient play. Suppose tokens are
ignored and never change hands. In the eﬃcient outcome payoﬀs are
vp :=

a + βg
1 − β2

and

vc :=
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u + g + β(a + u)
.
1 − β2

Eﬃcient play is supported as a subgame perfect equilibrium by a simple trigger strategy: in equilibrium, a player chooses C as a producer, and switches
to D forever after some producer choose D. Given public monitoring, if everyone adopts this strategy, then deviating to D triggers an immediate and
permanent switch to autarky.

Oﬀ-equilibrium, this sanction is incentive-

compatible because playing D forever is an equilibrium. Deviating to D in
equilibrium is suboptimal when vp ≥ v̂p , i.e., when the continuation probability
d−a
β ≥ β ∗ :=
. This holds in the experiment since β ∗ = 0.5 < β = 0.75.7
g−d+l
Proposition 1. In all treatments, a non-monetary strategy exists that supports
the eﬃcient allocation as a subgame perfect equilibrium.
In non-monetary equilibrium, producers make gifts to consumers. Tokens
never change hands in- or oﬀ-equilibrium, so their ﬂow payoﬀ u does not
aﬀect the existence conditions since initial producers never hold a token. The
condition β ≥ β ∗ is necessary and suﬃcient to support the eﬃcient allocation
as an equilibrium, but does not guarantee this outcome will emerge because in
this indeﬁnitely repeated game many other equilibria exist, including autarky.
Tokens can also be used to support eﬃcient play.
A monetary trade arrangement. Tokens assume the role of a currency
and acquire value if cooperation is conditioned on their transfer. Let initial
consumers have one token each and consider the monetary trade strategy. In
any round and after any history of play: (i) as a consumer, the player chooses
Spend if she has tokens, or else has no action to take; (ii) as a producer, she
chooses Sell if she has no tokens and the consumer has some (= monetary trade
7

There are 16 rounds before randomization starts; β ≥ β ∗ ensures that cooperation is
incentive-compatible in all rounds prior to randomization (see Bigoni et al., 2019).
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is possible). In all other circumstances, the producer chooses D.8 If everyone
adopts this strategy and no one deviates from it, then the economy is in
monetary equilibrium. Here, monetary trade is possible in all pairs because
each consumer has 1 token, and each producer has 0. A token is exchanged
quid-pro-quo for one good in all rounds, in every pair. This supports the
eﬃcient reallocation of goods, and also redistributes the ﬂow payoﬀ u—without
social eﬃciency implications. In monetary equilibrium the payoﬀ to initial
producer and consumer are
vp (0) :=

a + β(u + g)
1 − β2

and

vc (1) :=

u + g + βa
.
1 − β2

d−a
, then monetary trade is a
u+g−d+l
subgame perfect equilibrium when initial consumers have one token.
Proposition 2. If β ≥ β ∗ (u) :=

The proof is in Appendix A. Existence of monetary equilibrium depends
on a producer’s incentive compatibility constraint: he must prefer delaying
consumption, giving up a small beneﬁt d for a larger beneﬁt g next round.
Hence, the suﬃcient condition for the existence of monetary equilibrium hinges
on the threshold β ∗ (u). Intuitively, in monetary equilibrium there are two
simultaneous transfers: one good goes from producer to consumer, and one
token goes the opposite way. This outcome can also occur if the producer
chooses C, but this is not part of the monetary strategy because it is dominated
by Sell, which prevents the loss d in the event that a token is not received. For
8

Unlike the non-monetary trigger strategy, the monetary strategy is Markov and historyindependent, so it does not require information about others’ histories of play. It also does
not rely on a threat of community punishment to deter equilibrium deviations. Finally, it
does not prescribe a change in behavior oﬀ-equilibrium and—unlike the trigger strategy—it
supports some cooperation oﬀ-equilibrium: as oﬀ-equilibrium some consumers may have no
tokens, not all meetings allow monetary trade, hence trade occurs only in pairs where the
consumer has tokens and the producer has none, and 100% eﬃciency cannot be attained.
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this reason, monetary trade is incentive-compatible oﬀ-equilibrium, also.
If u = 0, then payoﬀs in monetary and non-monetary equilibrium coincide, and the existence conditions are identical. Instead, if u ̸= 0, monetary
equilibrium redistributes part of tokens’ ﬂow payoﬀs to initial producers, altering the incentives for monetary trade. If tokens carry a beneﬁt u > 0, then
deviating increases the economic loss for a producer (she gets no token) and,
hence, the threshold discount factor supporting monetary equilibrium falls.
The opposite holds when u < 0. Hence, the threshold β ∗ (u) declines in u,
β ∗ (u) = 0.55, 0.50, 0.46, 0.43 for, respectively u = −1, 0, 1, 2. This discussion
extends to Mix and, with some adjustment, to Fiat2.9
Summing up, non-monetary and monetary strategies support 100% eﬃciency in all treatments. Cooperation is the result of monetary trade when
consumer and producer both act in conformity with the monetary strategy
(Spend and Sell), and of a gift when they follow the non-monetary strategy
(Idle and C). Monetary trade and gifts generate the same cooperation level
and surplus. Cooperation can also result from the actions Spend and C, but
this outcome is inconsistent with either strategy. Monetary equilibrium is
supported on a larger set of parameters as u increases. This suggests:
H 1. Monetary trade should be at least as frequent when tokens yield a beneﬁt
than when they do not.
H 2. Monetary trade should be no more frequent when tokens yield a penalty
than when they do not.

9

In Mix, players can ignore one type of token and trade the other. In Fiat2, slightly
adjust the monetary strategy to ensure that initial consumers are not tempted to spend
their second token before producing for the ﬁrst time. This temptation can be eliminated
by specifying a reasonable set of beliefs oﬀ-equilibrium so that the condition supporting
monetary equilibrium is the same as in Proposition 2; see Section B.1 in Supp. Mat.
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Existence of monetary equilibrium depends on producers’ economic incentives. If they beneﬁt from selling for a token to reap the future beneﬁt g, then
consumers surely desire to spend tokens as they beneﬁt immediately.10 Also,
there is no economic incentive to produce for a token and hoard it forever after
because d ≥ βu/(1 − β) for all u ≤ 2.11 This suggests:
H 3. Hoarding of tokens should not occur in any treatment.
Finally, theory suggests that tokens should not circulate because eﬃciency
can be attained without exchanging them (Proposition 1). If so, the frequency
of monetary trade should not decline when beneﬁt-yielding tokens are present.
However, prior experiments do show that monetary trade emerges because
their use facilitates coordination on eﬃcient play (Bigoni et al., 2019; Camera
and Casari, 2014). Hence, we put forward the following:
H 4. Monetary trade should not decline when beneﬁt-yielding tokens replace
or complement plain tokens.
The reason is that if both kinds of tokens are present (as in Mix), this
neither removes the equilibria available in Fiat, nor prevents the use of plain
tokens. An equilibrium exists in which plain tokens circulate as money, while
beneﬁt-yielding tokens are hoarded; see Camera et al. (2003) for experimental
evidence on this Gresham’s Law type of outcomes. Instead, if beneﬁt-yielding
tokens replace plain tokens (as in Switch), then the economic incentives for
monetary trade should become stronger (Proposition 2).

This is intuitive when u ≤ 0, while for u > 0 if producers prefer to give up d for a token
to be spent tomorrow to earn g, then consumers have an even greater economic incentive
to trade because they give up u < d − l tomorrow but earn g immediately.
11
Section B.2 in Supp. Mat. discusses in more depth the issue of hoarding.
10
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5

Results

It is helpful to give an overview by investigating the empirical relation between
incidence of monetary trade and economic performance in the experiment.12
Let proﬁt denote the points earned by a participant in the average meeting
(excluding earnings from holding tokens). It ranges from 1.5 to 10.5 points, is
7.5 points in the eﬃcient outcome, and 4.5 points in autarky (see Appendix
A.3). Realized surplus is the diﬀerence between average proﬁt in the economy
and autarky proﬁts. Dividing this by its theoretical 3-points maximum gives
realized eﬃciency; it is proportional to average cooperation in the economy,
ranging from 0% in autarky, to 100% under full cooperation.
Result 1. There is a positive association between realized eﬃciency and the
frequency of monetary trade.
Fig. 1 plots realized eﬃciency in an economy, against the frequency of
monetary trade (all meetings). This frequency depends directly on choices
in meetings where the consumer has tokens (monetary trade is possible), and
indirectly on the tokens’ distribution resulting from those choices, which determines how frequently trade is impossible in a meeting (0.39, all treatments).
The correlation between monetary trade and eﬃciency is 0.754. A one
standard deviation increment in the frequency of monetary trade is associated
with an eﬃciency increment of about 19 percentage points; see Supp. Mat.,
Table B2. This positive association conﬁrms earlier results for economies of
strangers (e..g, Camera and Casari, 2014; Camera et al., 2013). The novel
observation is that realized eﬃciency and the exchange of tokens depend on
the type of tokens made available to participants.
12

To reduce noise and enhance comparability across sessions, the analysis focuses on rounds
1-16, which are common to all supergames. Supergames lasted 19.6 rounds on average
(min. 16, max. 32) with a standard deviation of 4.2.
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Figure 1: Monetary Strategy vs. Realized Eﬃciency: All Treatments

Realized Efficiency

1

.75

.5

.25
Plain tokens, only
Other tokens or mix

0

0

.25

.5
Monetary Trade

.75

1

Notes: One obs.=one economy (all meetings in rounds 1-16), all treatments (N = 315).

Economies endowed only with plain tokens (dots) tend to perform better than those endowed with sophisticated tokens (crosses). A majority of
plain-tokens economies reached at least 50% realized eﬃciency as opposed to
very few sophisticated-token economies (56% vs. 14%, N=61/108 vs. 30/207,
respectively). In fact, this observation applies to any given eﬃciency level.13
Monetary trade is also more frequent when tokens are plain. If monetary trade
occurred whenever it was possible, then the markers in Fig. 1 should align
along the 45 degree line. Markers above the 45 degree line indicate that eﬃcient outcomes frequently occurred without tokens being exchanged. Markers
are below the 45 degree if ineﬃcient outcomes occurred when monetary trade
was feasible—seen especially in sophisticated-tokens economies.
13

The distribution of eﬃciency in economies endowed only with plain tokens stochastically
dominates (in the ﬁrst-order sense) the distribution in economies endowed with sophisticated tokens. See Supp. Mat., Fig. B1.
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Hence, not all tokens seem equally suitable for supporting eﬃcient play.
The question is why. Did some tokens slow or prevent the development of
a monetary system, and why? To oﬀer an answer we study outcomes and
individual behavior with diﬀerent types of tokens.

5.1

Plain tokens facilitate monetary trade

Participants in Fiat economies learned to coordinate on eﬃcient play by increasingly relying on tokens’ exchange.
Result 2. In Fiat economies monetary trade supported eﬃcient play, and
increased as participants gained experience with the task
Fig. 2 reports the relative frequency of outcomes experienced by the average subject in a supergame (all meetings).
Figure 2: Outcomes for Average Subject of Fiat.
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Cooperation
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Monetary Trade is Possible
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Notes: One obs.=one subject in a supergame, all meetings of rounds 1-16 (N = 72 per
supergame). The whiskers identify the standard error of the mean frequency (markers).
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A meeting can result in Cooperation or Defection. Cooperation can be supported by Monetary Trade, or by a Gift if the producer unconditionally cooperates (C) and does not receive a token. Cooperation was primarily supported
by monetary trade because this strategy gives the subject greater control over
outcomes, it mitigates strategic uncertainty and facilitates coordination on efﬁcient play (Camera and Casari, 2014; Camera et al., 2013).14 Monetary trade
almost doubled from 0.21 to 0.39 during the session, while the frequency of
gifts remained low. This increased cooperation from 0.43 in supergame 1 to
0.57 in supergame 5. Yet, we do not observe full cooperation; the primary
reason is that tokens did not optimally circulate due to heterogeneous behavior; for instance, about 8% of participants always chose D as producers.
Hence, consumers did not always have a token; on average monetary trade was
possible in about 60% of meetings (dashed line in Fig. 2).
The signiﬁcance of these ﬁndings is established by panel regressions; see
Supp. Mat., Table B3. Players learned to coordinate on monetary trade and
avoided non-monetary norms of mutual support: cooperation improved thanks
to increased exchange of tokens, not gifts. This greater circulation of tokens
had a positive self-reinforcing eﬀect, making trade possible in more meetings,
which supported more cooperation. A one standard deviation increase in the
frequency of meetings where trade is possible raised cooperation by about 11
percentage points, and decreased the frequency of gifts by about 7 percentage
points. Yet, acceptability problems did not get fully resolved during a session, which contributed to limit the exchange value of tokens by keeping their
distribution oﬀ equilibrium and, hence, cooperation below 100%.
The constraining impact of this “illiquidity” on eﬃcient play becomes apparent if we study meetings where monetary trade was possible; see Supp.
14

In 0.07 meetings a token was exchanged without the producer requesting it (C and Sell).
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Mat., Table B4. There, gift-giving outcomes were close to zero, while monetary trade almost doubled between start and end of a session. An interpretation is that participants did not trust that a cooperative action would be
later reciprocated by a stranger, unless a barren token was oﬀered as compensation. They learned that oﬀering tokens could raise the chance of a cooperative outcome—hence they increasingly did so as the session progressed
(the frequency of Spend is close to 1 by supergame 4)—and, consequently,
more frequently demanded tokens. Still, the frequency of Sell remained below
the Spend frequency, betraying an acceptability problem. This constrained
the growth in monetary trade and, hence, cooperation.15 A way to mitigate
acceptability problems is to make tokens more economically enticing. Could
beneﬁt-yielding tokens improve outcomes? We oﬀer an answer by studying
economies exclusively endowed with “sophisticated” tokens.

5.2

Sophisticated tokens hinder monetary trade

Consider Penalty, Reward, and Reward2, which replace plain with sophisticated tokens with holding ﬂows u = −1, 1, 2, respectively. Everything
else is as in Fiat.
Result 3. Substituting plain with sophisticated tokens lowered cooperation.
The left panel in Fig. 3 shows the evolution of cooperation (equivalently,
realized eﬃciency) during the average session, by treatment. Average cooperation in supergame 1 is similar across treatments, a similarity that quickly
disappears as participants gained experience with the task. Overall, average
cooperation in a session was 0.35, 0.27, and 0.24 in Penalty, Reward and
Reward2, which are well below the 0.52 level in Fiat. This cooperation
15

For the signiﬁcance of these observations see Supp. Mat., Table B5.
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decline is statistically signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level for u > 0, and insigniﬁcant for u = −1 (two-sided ranksum tests with exact statistics, N = 3
sessions per treatment).
Figure 3: Outcomes for Average Subject in One-Token Economies.
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Notes: See notes to Fig. 2. Fiat added as a comparison.

The panel regression in Table 4 provides additional evidence. None of
the treatment coeﬃcients in col. 1 is statistically signiﬁcant, suggesting that
inexperienced subjects behaved similarly across treatments (conﬁrmed by a
regression on supergame 1 data, not reported). Instead, in later supergames
cooperation was lower in all treatments as compared to Fiat. All coeﬃcients
on Treatment × Game are negative and their sum with the Game coeﬃcient
is negative (Wald tests results are highly signiﬁcant for Penalty and Reward2, insigniﬁcant for Reward). In summary, in economies endowed with
sophisticated tokens something interfered with participants’ ability to learn to
coordinate on eﬃcient play. Not only cooperation did not improve when to22

kens generated positive income ﬂows, but it progressively declined during the
session, which is opposite of what happened in plain-token economies. The
cause of this failure is discussed next.
Table 4: The Impact of Sophisticated Tokens.
Dep. var.:
Trade Possible
Treatment
Penalty
Reward
Reward2
Game
Penalty × Game
Reward × Game
Reward2 × Game
Controls
Constant
N
R2 within
R2 between
R2 overall

(1) Cooperation
Coeﬀ.
S.E.

(2) Gift
Coeﬀ.

S.E.

0.080***

(0.021) -0.044*** (0.009)

-0.007
-0.122
-0.046
0.020
-0.045**
-0.031
-0.060***
Yes
0.422***
1440
0.163
0.415
0.303

(0.089)
(0.083)
(0.082)
(0.013)
(0.020)
(0.020)
(0.013)

-0.001
-0.006
-0.006
-0.007
-0.006
-0.014
-0.016*
Yes
(0.068) 0.168***
1440
0.169
0.073
0.130

(0.057)
(0.061)
(0.059)
(0.009)
(0.010)
(0.010)
(0.010)

(3) Monetary Trade
Coeﬀ.
S.E.

-0.055
-0.093**
-0.024
0.040***
-0.050***
-0.029***
-0.056***
Yes
(0.054) 0.183***
1440
0.063
0.426
0.255

(0.041)
(0.041)
(0.039)
(0.001)
(0.007)
(0.009)
(0.004)
(0.030)

Notes: Panel regression with random eﬀects at the individual level and robust standard errors (S.E.) adjusted for clustering at the session level. One obs.=one subject in a supergame
(all meetings, rounds 1-16). Treatment indicators take value 1 in the respective treatment,
else 0 (Fiat serves as the basis of the regression). Game is a continuous regressor taking
values 1-5. Controls include duration of previous supergame, self-reported sex, and two
measures of understanding of instructions (response time and wrong answers in the quiz).
Symbols ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.

Result 4. Endowing participants with sophisticated tokens, instead of plain,
prevented the emergence of monetary trade.
Evidence is in the right panel of Fig. 3 and cols. 2-3 in Table 4. The
average frequency of monetary trade was 0.11, 0.14 and 0.12 for u = −1, 1, 2
economies, which are all signiﬁcantly smaller than the 0.32 value of Fiat (twosided ranksum tests with exact statistics, p-value=0.10, N = 3). Monetary
23

trade remained well below the levels observed in Fiat from the start of a
session (this is statistically signiﬁcant for u = −1, 1 according to a regression
using supergame 1 data, not reported). Monetary trade also either did not
improve or outright declined with experience. Evidence is in col. 3 of Table 4,
where the Treatment coeﬃcients are all negative (signiﬁcant only for u = 1)
and their interaction with the Game coeﬃcient is also negative and signiﬁcant.
Hence, H1 can be rejected: beneﬁt-yielding tokens did not facilitate monetary
trade but, rather, prevented it. Instead, we cannot reject H2: when u = −1
tokens supported signiﬁcantly less monetary trade than u = 0.
Was this decline in trade the result of coordination on some non-monetary
norm of cooperation? The data does not support this conjecture. The frequency of outcomes consistent with gifts being made did not diﬀer from the
Fiat treatment (0.13, 0.14, 0.11 and 0.10 for u = −1, 0, 1, 2) and gifts did not
increase during the session. In col. 2 of Table 4, the coeﬃcients on treatment
and their interaction with Game are all negative, often signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero. Summing up, endowing an economy with sophisticated tokens precluded the spontaneous emergence of a monetary system. To understand why
this happened we study individual choices.
Result 5. Adding a small penalty for holding tokens decreased their acceptability. Adding a small beneﬁt led to hoarding. Both interventions reduced
tokens’ circulation, as compared to plain tokens.
Theoretically, the choice Spend should be at least as frequent as Sell because in monetary equilibrium incentive compatibility constraints are slacker
for consumers than producers (see Section 4). Table 5 displays the average
frequency of these two choices in meetings where monetary trade was possible.
As compared to Fiat, the frequency of Sell improved when holding tokens
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carried a 2-point beneﬁt, while it sharply declined with a 1-point penalty.
Table 5: Meetings where Trade is Possible
Choices
Treatment Spend
Penalty
Fiat
Reward
Reward2
Fiat2
Mix
Switch

0.88
0.86
0.48
0.41
0.89
0.68
0.75

Outcomes

Sell

Mon. Trade Gift

0.23
0.59
0.62
0.70
0.53
0.54
0.68

0.20
0.51
0.30
0.28
0.49
0.21
0.51

0.02
0.01
0.03
0.03
0.02
0.03
0.01

Share
0.55
0.61
0.51
0.5
0.83
0.68
0.56

Notes: One obs.: one subject in a supergame, meetings where trade is possible of rounds
1-16. Choices: relative frequency of Sell choice (as a producer in the supergame), and
Spend choice (as a consumer). Outcomes: relative frequency of Monetary Trade and Gift.
Share: overall share of meetings in which trade was possible (the consumer had tokens; Mix
includes all meetings where consumers had at least one type of token).

To establish the signiﬁcance of these observations we study how treatments
aﬀected the distribution of producers’ choices when monetary trade was possible using a multinomial logit model because the three actions available—D,
C and Sell—have no natural ordering. Table 6 reports marginal eﬀects.
Table 6: Producer’s choices when monetary trade is possible (marginal eﬀects).

Dep. var. = choice
Penalty (u = −1)
Reward (u = 1)
Reward2 (u = 2)

D
coeﬀ.
0.255*
0.014
-0.091**

C
(S.E.)
(0.135)
(0.048)
(0.041)

coeﬀ.
0.099
-0.061
-0.065

Sell
(S.E.)
(0.095)
(0.040)
(0.040)

coeﬀ.
-0.354***
0.047
0.156**

(S.E.)
(0.063)
(0.053)
(0.064)

Notes: Multinomial logit regression on producer’s choices. One obs.=one producer in a
meeting where trade is possible, rounds 1-16. Data from Fiat (the base of the regression),
Reward, Reward2, and Penalty (N = 6265). Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering
at session level. The model includes a supergame regressor interacted with treatments,
indicator variables for each round 1-16, and standard controls (not reported). Symbols ∗ ∗ ∗,
∗∗, and ∗ indicate signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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A one-point penalty from holding tokens signiﬁcantly lowers the demand
for tokens (Sell) by 0.35 points and increases the probability of D by 0.25 (see
the Penalty coeﬃcients). A two-point reward causes the opposite shift: the
probability of Sell increases by 16 percentage points, while that of unconditional defection falls by 9. Instead, a one-point reward induces a small and
statistically insigniﬁcant increase in acceptance probability (the coeﬃcients on
Reward2 and Reward are statistically diﬀerent, Wald test, p-value=0.025).
The decline in tokens’ acceptability induced by adding holding costs prevented a monetary system from emerging in Penalty. But what explains
the lack of monetary trade when holding tokens yielded beneﬁts? There, producers’ demand for tokens increased relative to Fiat but consumers hoarded
them; see col. Spend in Table 5. The signiﬁcance of these observations is
established by a logit regression about consumer choices in meetings where
trade was possible; marginal eﬀects are in Table 7.
Table 7: Hoarding if Trade is Possible and Gifts if Trade is Impossible.

Dep. var.:
choice

(1) Consumer chooses Spend
(trade is possible)

(2) Producer chooses C
(trade is impossible)

Penalty
Reward
Reward2
N

Coeﬀ.
0.026
-0.401***
-0.490***
6265

Coeﬀ.
-0.064
-0.163
-0.174*
5255

S.E.
(0.029)
(0.058)
(0.082)

S.E.
(0.097)
(0.126)
(0.094)

Notes: Marginal eﬀects from Logit regression on consumer’s choices (if trade is possible),
and producer’s choices (if trade is impossible). One obs.=one subject in a round 1-16.
Data from Fiat (the base of the regression), Reward, Reward2, and Penalty. Robust
standard errors adjusted for clustering at session level. Reg. (1): dependent variable is 1 if
the consumer chooses Spend, 0 otherwise. Reg. (2): dependent variable is 1 if the producer
chooses C, 0 otherwise. We also include a supergame regressor interacted with treatment,
dummies for each round 1-16, and standard controls (not reported). Symbols ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and
∗ indicate signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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Consumers were signiﬁcantly less likely to spend beneﬁt-yielding tokens (40
and 49 percentage points, for Reward and Reward2). Instead, introducing
a holding penalty did not increase the probability to spend them relative to
plain tokens (see the Penalty coeﬃcient). Based on this evidence H3 is rejected
for treatments with u = 1, 2, but not u = −1, 0 where hoarding of tokens did
not occur (consistent with theory). Given these acceptability and hoarding
problems, did players try to establish an alternative cooperative norm based
on gifts? The answer is negative. Gifts did not increase as compared to Fiat;
see Table 5 and the treatment coeﬃcients in Tables 6 and 7 for meetings where
trade was possible and impossible, respectively.
The conclusion that plain tokens performed as a better money than sophisticated tokens can be further qualiﬁed by calculating a “liquidity value”
of tokens, i.e., the value linked to their use as a means of payment. This value
is an indirect ﬂow payoﬀ, a rough measure of which is the diﬀerence between
the income expected by a consumer entering a meeting with some tokens as
opposed to none. The liquidity value is largest when tokens reduce strategic
uncertainty because oﬀering them is likely to result in cooperation. In monetary equilibrium the liquidity value of the ﬁrst token is greater than a second
token (which should be zero, as only one token is needed to support eﬃcient
play), so the incentive to trade is largest for a token-less producer. If tokens
have primarily a liquidity value in the experiment, then we should observe
cooperation rates that decline in the producer’s token holdings.
Table 8, which reports cooperation rates conditional on token holdings
in a meeting—as we move away from plain tokens to a 1-point penalty and
reward—conﬁrms this prediction. The data in this table can also be used
to determine a rough liquidity value measure of tokens (the calculations are
in Appendix A, Section A.4), which turns out to be twice as large in Fiat
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as compared to the other two treatments. The reasons is that cooperation
was highest in Fiat as compared to he other two treatments, in every meeting where trade was possible; in other words, plain tokens reduced strategic
uncertainty the most.
Table 8: Distribution of token holdings and associated cooperation.
Producer
holdings
0
1+

Penalty
0
1+

Consumer holdings
Fiat
0
1+

23 (0.28) 44 (0.43)
22 (0.26) 11(0.29)

25 (0.36) 49 (0.68)
14 (0.28) 12 (0.49)

Reward
0

1+

27 (0.23) 38 (0.37)
22 (0.13) 14 (0.31)

Notes: Unit of obs.: one meeting in round 1-16 (N = 2, 880 per treatment). 0= participant
starts the meeting without a token. 1+= participant starts the meeting with 1 or more
tokens (accumulation of 2 or more tokens was infrequent, around 10% to 12%). The cells
report the share of meetings and the cooperation rate in those meetings (in parentheses).

Summing up, endowing an economy with beneﬁt-yielding instead of plain
tokens signiﬁcantly reduced cooperation and eﬃciency because it stunted the
development of a monetary trade convention. Could this be reversed if participants were given the freedom to select between sophisticated or plain tokens,
as a monetary instrument? This possibility is investigated next.

5.3

Economies with competing tokens

In Mix initial consumers have one plain as well as one beneﬁt-yielding token
u = 2. This allows a choice of token which expands their choice set. Participants see what tokens can be traded, if any (not the exact quantity), and
can only select one token type to trade (if two are available). After choosing,
outcome and counterpart’s choice are revealed. A token is transferred only if
both choices are mutually compatible. For instance, if a producer demands a
sophisticated token and the consumer oﬀers a plain token, then there is neither
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cooperation nor a token transfer. Failed trades cannot be re-attempted with
another token; more details are in Appendix A, Section A.1.
In Fiat2 initial consumers have two plain tokens each. Hence, both Mix
and Fiat2 economies could support the trade of plain tokens, similarly to
what we observed in Fiat.
Result 6. Eﬃciency and monetary trade declined in Mix as compared to both
Fiat and Fiat2, where outcomes were instead similar.
Fig. 4 shows that in Mix cooperation starts at levels similar to Fiat, but
then steadily declines because participants did not learn to exchange tokens.
Trade (with any token) averaged 14%, well below Fiat levels. Gifts were also
less frequent (0.06 vs. 0.15 in Fiat). The panel regressions in Supp. Mat.,
Table B6, establish the signiﬁcance of these observations.
Figure 4: Outcomes for Average Subject of Fiat2 and Mix.
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Notes: See notes to Fig. 2. Fiat added as a comparison.

Is it possible that doubling the number of tokens in Mix reduced the in29

centives to cooperate by increasing the number of meetings where trade was
possible? We can reject this hypothesis. First, in Fiat cooperation increased
in the frequency of meetings where trade was possible (see Table 4). Second,
if we consider Fiat2—which has twice the Fiat token supply—we see that
monetary trade grew faster than in Fiat (Fig. 4). Doubling the plain token
supply made monetary trade possible in 83% of meetings vs. 61% in Fiat
(Table 5). This boosted monetary trade and cooperation, something we do
not observe in Mix. In Fiat2 participants learned to coordinate on trading
cooperation for a plain token much as they did in Fiat. In fact, monetary
trade and cooperation increased signiﬁcantly more during the session than in
Fiat. Table B6 in Supp. Mat. provides econometric evidence.16
Result 2 is thus robust to doubling the plain tokens supply, and Results
3-4 are robust to adding beneﬁt-yielding tokens alongside plain ones. As eﬃciency levels were lower in Mix than Fiat2, H4 can be rejected. This result
is surprising because subjects could have coordinated on trading with plain
tokens—Fiat shows they were capable of doing so. Yet, giving them a choice
between plain and beneﬁt-yielding tokens exacerbated the acceptability problems seen in Fiat, without resolving the hoarding problems seen in Reward2.
Result 7. In Mix, there was hoarding of sophisticated tokens, and lower acceptability of plain tokens relative to Fiat. Trading choices in Fiat2 did not
diﬀer from Fiat.
Participants in Mix infrequently traded when it was possible, independent
of the consumer’s portfolio. Three observations from Table 9, which reports
16

By contrast, gifts declined in Fiat2, from 15% at the session start to 3% at the end.
Overall, gifts occurred in 7% of meetings, which is half of Fiat. This suggests that
producers might have made gifts to token-less consumers primarily to overcome illiquidity
problems outside of their control. Indeed, in Fiat2 the larger token supply reduced the
probability that being token-less was due to a shortage of tokens.
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choices in meetings where some token could be exchanged, stand out.
Table 9: Distribution of choices in a meeting of Mix.
Consumer’s Choice
Token(s) held
by consumer
None (32%)
Plain only (17%)
Sophisticated only (19%)
Both types (32%)

Keep Spend Spend
token(s) Soph. Plain
–
0.14
0.67
0.19

–
–
0.33
0.23

–
0.86
–
0.58

Producer’s Choice
D

C

0.79
0.60
0.29
0.21

0.21
0.14
0.06
0.09

Sell for Sell for
Soph. Plain
–
–
0.64
0.60

–
0.26
–
0.10

Notes: Unit of obs.: one meeting in a period (rounds 1-16). The relative frequency of
choices reported is conditional on the consumer’s token holdings (the share of each possible
portfolio is in parentheses). A dash “–” indicates that the choice was not available. For
each portfolio, the sum of choices of a consumer (producer) sums up to 1. None: meetings
where trade is not possible for any token.

First, producers infrequently accepted a plain token when they knew it was
the only type available (0.26 freq.) and simply defected (0.60). Compare this
with a 0.59 frequency of Sell under an identical decisional situation in Fiat
(Table 5). Second, when consumers had just sophisticated tokens (19% of
meetings) they preferred to keep them (0.67 freq.) even if producers demanded
them (0.69 freq.). Third, when consumers were known to have both types of
tokens (32% of meetings), producers shunned the plain and demanded the
other (0.10 vs. 0.60). Consumers did the opposite, oﬀering the plain while
hoarding the other (0.58 vs. 0.23). This incompatibility of choices persisted.
Hoarding sophisticated tokens, while oﬀering plain tokens as a consumer
and refusing them as a producer prevented the circulation of both kinds of
tokens. This precluded the emergence of monetary trade convention, leading
to low cooperation and eﬃciency. By contrast, we do not see this in Fiat2,
where trading choices’ were similar to Fiat economies (89% vs. 86% for Spend,
and 53% vs. 59% for Sell, see Table 5). We thus exclude that the minimal
plain tokens trade in Mix is due to the mere doubling of the number of tokens.
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Table 10: Outcomes in a Fiat2 and Mix meeting: Marginal Eﬀects.
Dep. variable=
outcome
Fiat2
Mix

D
(1)
0.008
(0.050)
0.017
(0.043)

Failed Trade
(2)
-0.054
(0.035)
0.343***
(0.069)

Gift
(3)
0.042
(0.063)
-0.063
(0.069)

Monetary Trade
(4)
0.004
(0.060)
-0.297***
(0.037)

Notes: Multinomial logit regression on outcome experienced by producers in a meeting.
One obs.=one producer in rounds 1-16 (all meetings). Data from Fiat (the base of the
regression), Fiat2, and Mix (N = 6114). Dep. Variables: D= producer selects D, Failed
Trade=producer selects Sell for some token but the consumer’s choice is incompatible, Gift=
producer selects C, and Monetary Trade=producer selects Sell for some token and the consumer oﬀers that token. Robust standard errors (in parentheses) adjusted for clustering at
session level. We also include a supergame regressor interacted with the treatment, a series
of dummies for each round 1-16, and standard controls (not reported). Symbols ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗,
and ∗ indicate signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.

The multinomial logit regression in Table 10 establishes the signiﬁcance
of these observations. The dependent variable is a categorical variable taking
one of four possible values based on four mutually exclusive outcomes that can
be experienced by a producer: (i) “D” if no cooperation occurs because the
producer refuses to cooperate (selects D); (ii) “Failed Trade” if no cooperation
occurs because the producer’s choice to trade for a speciﬁc token is incompatible with the consumer’s; (iii) “Gift” if cooperation occurs because the producer
unconditionally cooperates (selects C); and (iv) “Monetary Trade” if cooperation occurs because the producer and consumer’s choices to trade cooperation
for a speciﬁc token are compatible. Two indicator variables capture treatment
eﬀects (Fiat is the base), and the additional explanatory variables used in the
earlier logit regressions are included.
Doubling the supply of plain tokens did not signiﬁcantly aﬀect the distribution of outcomes (the coeﬃcients on Fiat2 are close to zero and insigniﬁcant).
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Yet, we cannot reject the hypothesis that adding sophisticated tokens to plain
tokens aﬀected outcomes: monetary trade declined by 30 percentage points,
due an increase in failed trades (the coeﬃcient on Mix is negative and highly
signiﬁcant in cols. 2 and 4). There is no signiﬁcant eﬀect on the frequency of
gifts or unconditional defection (the coeﬃcient on Mix is small and insigniﬁcant in cols. 1 and 3). Hence, H3 can be rejected for Mix. Possibly, the option
to choose between diﬀerent tokens acted as a friction, increasing coordination
complexity that prevented the development of a monetary trade convention.
To investigate this, we ran the Switch treatment.

5.4

Engineering a transition to sophisticated tokens

The Switch treatment alters the Fiat design by replacing plain with beneﬁtyielding tokens after supergame 2. If coordination complexity is responsible
for the lack of monetary trade in Mix, then having a chance to initially develop
a monetary trade convention with plain tokens should facilitate a transition
to beneﬁt-yielding tokens. To mitigate hoarding, beneﬁt-yielding tokens yield
either 0 or 2 points with equal probability (iid across rounds), so the expected
beneﬁt is 1 point as in Reward, but less attractive being random. We thus can
compare Switch to Fiat in supergames 1-2, and to Reward in supergames
3-5. Based on the data, we can reject H 4.
Result 8. In Switch, monetary trade and cooperation permanently declined
after beneﬁt-yielding tokens replaced plain ones. Monetary trade was less frequent than Fiat but more frequent than Reward.
Fig. 3 shows that switching to beneﬁt-yielding tokens stunted the development of a monetary system, as players less frequently traded tokens for
cooperation. Cooperation in Switch and Fiat is similar in supergames 1-2
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(0.46 vs. 0.48 on average). In supergames 3-5 it falls toward Reward levels
(0.35 vs. 0.26), a decline due to a drop in monetary trade. Before supergame
3, monetary trade is slightly more frequent in Switch than Fiat (0.31 vs.
0.26); afterward, it declines to 0.27, which pushed the economy close to but
not as low as Reward levels (0.15 on average in supergames 3-5). This suggests that initially establishing a monetary trade convention with plain tokens
helped to support the exchange of sophisticated tokens—to some extent. As
in Reward, the cause of this decline is hoarding behavior. In supergames 3-5,
consumers who had a token oﬀered it in 76% of meetings as compared to 92%
of Fiat. These observations are signiﬁcant according to a panel regression
in Supp. Mat., Table B7. Hence, we can reject H3-H4 when beneﬁt-yielding
tokens replaced plain ones. The coordination on trade achieved with plain
tokens suﬀered as sophisticated-tokens replaced them.17

6

Discussion

Central Bank digital currency is poised to replace or complement traditional
coins and banknotes in the near future. A crucial feature of the proposed
new instruments is the possibility to generate small cash ﬂows, positive or
negative. Standard theory does not raise speciﬁc concerns about the interestbearing feature and, in fact, suggests that it could be beneﬁcial for policy
purposes. By interfacing standard theory with the experimental methodology,
this study adds a much-needed empirical angle to this important debate.
The experiment provides evidence of a strong positive association between
the frequency of monetary trade and realized eﬃciency (Result 1). When a
17

This diﬃculty in carrying over eﬃcient play across similar indeﬁnitely repeated games is
also observed in (Duﬀy and Fehr, 2018), where coordination in a stag-hunt game does not
bring about cooperation in a subsequent PD game, and vice-versa.
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monetary system did not emerge, or was poorly functioning, eﬃciency also suffered because participants were unable to support high-payoﬀ equilibria without a well-functioning monetary system. This evidence conﬁrms the ﬁndings
about the nature of money earlier reported in Camera and Casari (2014) and
related studies. Exchanging an intrinsically worthless tokens supported cooperation because in the experiment there are multiple equilibria and players’
incentives are imperfectly aligned. Trading a token for cooperation mitigates
strategic uncertainty problems, facilitating coordination on eﬃcient play. This
coordination role of monetary exchange is especially valuable as groups grow
in size (Camera et al., 2013), and operates also if reputation mechanisms are
available (Bigoni et al., 2020). Among its beneﬁts, monetary trade makes cooperation evolutionarily stable because it boosts traders’ ﬁtness above that of
free riders (Camera et al., 2013), and is risk dominant because it limits exposure to potential losses, unlike non-monetary norms of cooperation (Bigoni
et al., 2019). Intuitively, trading tokens for cooperation oﬀers three complementary advantages: (i) conditional cooperators can easily coordinate with
like-minded individuals, even if there are few; (ii) it deters defections because
those without tokens can only hope to beneﬁt when meeting unconditional
cooperators; (iii) it limits oﬀ-equilibrium economic losses to meetings where
consumers have no tokens (no trade is possible), thus making cooperation
more resilient to isolated misconduct as compared to a trigger strategy based
on coordinated community punishments.
In economies exclusively endowed with plain tokens, participants learned to
optimally reallocate resources among themselves through monetary exchange
(Result 2). This contrasts with economies exclusively endowed with sophisticated, interest-bearing tokens, which failed to develop a monetary system (Results 3-5). This is a novel result, which oﬀers a fresh perspective for Central
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Banks considering currency innovation. One may conjecture that penalizing
currency holdings should discourage hoarding and boost spending; conversely,
rewarding holdings should increase the instrument’s attractiveness, encourage
its acceptability, hence its circulation and value.18 This is not what happened
in the experiment. Introducing a negative interest on tokens degraded the
monetary system because it sharply reduced acceptability without boosting
spending, eﬀectively making tokens a poor medium of exchange. Introducing a positive interest encouraged hoarding and failed to raise acceptability,
thus reducing circulation. An insight is that penalizing currency holdings to
boost spending might work as long as the demand for currency is suﬃciently
inelastic, while rewarding holdings to encourage acceptability might work if
hoarding behavior is inelastic.
What explains the asymmetric responses of consumers and producers observed in the experiment? A possibility is a misalignment of incentives. With
plain tokens, participants are theoretically indiﬀerent between achieving eﬃcient play through a monetary or non-monetary convention because the initial
token distribution cannot aﬀect the earnings distribution. By contrast, if tokens carry a positive interest, then initial producers (consumers) should prefer
a monetary (non-monetary) convention, while the converse holds true if interest is negative. The diﬀerence in consumer and producer reactions observed in
the experiment might thus reﬂect their desire to signal their preferred equilibrium. Another possible explanation is strategic uncertainty. If selection of the
monetary equilibrium is uncertain, players might be tempted to take a safe
action instead of risking a loss by trading; consumers might thus hoard tokens
that yield beneﬁts (as the token might not come back), while producers might
18

For instance, Cœuré and Loh (2018) note that “The payment of (positive) interest would
likely enhance the attractiveness of an instrument that also serves as a store of value.”
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refuse tokens that generate penalties (as the token might not be expendable).
These ﬁndings emerge also when participants had a choice of tokens (Results 6-7). This is surprising because in Mix plain tokens could support trade
as in a Gresham’s Law equilibrium where the “bad” money circulates and the
“good” money is hoarded. But Mix stunted the emergence of a monetary
system—beneﬁt-yielding tokens were hoarded while plain tokens were seldom
accepted. Possibly, having two types of tokens magniﬁed coordination problems.19 Yet, other factors must be at play because monetary trade declined also
in Switch when interest-paying tokens replaced plain ones—thought trade
did not completely unravel as it happened in Reward (Result 8). Hence, the
coordination achieved with plain tokens did not entirely dissipate.
Would the results change in a design where monetary trade is imposed
and gift-giving is ruled out? Two earlier experiments suggest a reason for
skepticism. In Camera et al. (2003) buyers and sellers traded on a market
with a plain ﬁat money or an interest-bearing money. Fiat money supported
high eﬃciency, but not the interest-bearing money—which induced hoarding.
In Camera et al. (2016) random buyer-seller pairs traded either with a plain
cash instrument or a superior electronic payment instrument that was costly
to sellers. Sellers largely accepted electronic payments but not buyers, which
prevented their widespread adoption and lowered eﬃciency. This evidence
suggests that adoption of a new payment instrument may fail even if sellers
accept it—both sides of the market must be receptive to the innovation.
19

This result would likely hold even if failed trades could be re-attempted with another token.
Counterparts’ choices were observable, so participants could coordinate over time. Yet,
the mismatch in oﬀers and requests persisted: producers kept demanding interest-paying
tokens, while consumers insisted on oﬀering plain ones. The cash and digital payments
instruments experiment in Camera et al. (2016) also reveals that allowing buyers to oﬀer a
payment instrument and switch to another upon the seller’s refusal, did not fundamentally
alter results about adoption, pricing, and eﬃciency as compared to a baseline scenario
where failed trades could not be reattempted.
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The angle of inquiry of this study can help evaluating diﬀerent typologies of
currency innovation, and assess the design of digital currencies. An insight is
that absent externally-imposed transaction catalysts, e.g., legal tender or full
convertibility, introducing a new currency instrument may backﬁre if it engenders strategic uncertainty, mistrust or miscoordination. To the extent that the
principles of operation in the experiment also apply to ﬁeld economies, it sheds
light on possible shortcomings of introducing a novel currency instrument. Are
there preventive steps to avoid possible monetary system instability? Legal
tender laws could help mitigate acceptability problems, albeit without entirely
eliminating them. A transparent and trusted regulatory framework that imposes clear limits on size and scope of possible beneﬁts or penalties on the
instrument might address hoarding tendencies and reduce adoption problems.
Overall, this study uncovered a desirable feature of currency instruments: they
should be plain, and hence unencumbered by additional valuation margins inherent in more sophisticated instruments. In the experiment, those additional
valuation aspects distorted decisions, preventing a focus on the instrument’s
primary role, which is to serve as a trusted means of payment.
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A

Appendix

A.1

Design and Procedures: Additional Details

Sophisticated Tokens: several reasons suggest a design where interest is
paid in points, and not tokens. First, we wish to maintain a stable supply
of tokens, which in the baseline treatment is ﬁxed at four. Paying interest in
token would not allow a stable token supply in sophisticated-token treatments.
Second, a varying token supply would bias the outcome against monetary
trade; a growing or declining token supply distorts economic incentives during
the supergame (altering the value of holding a token) and adds unnecessary
complexity to the cognitive task faced by subjects.
Interaction in a meeting of the Mix treatment. This section discusses
the actions available in a meeting of Mix, when two token types (called A and
B) are held by the consumer. The stage game is in Table A1.
Table A1: The stage game when the consumer has two token types, A and B
Producer
D

C

Sell for A

Sell for B

Idle

3, 6
3, 6

3, 6
A
⃝
15, 0

3, 6

Spend A
Spend B

3, 6

15, 0
A
⃝
15, 0
B
⃝
15, 0

Consumer

3, 6

3, 6
B
⃝
15, 0

A and ⃝
B indicate the transfer of a
Notes: Payoﬀs to Consumer, Producer, in points. ⃝
token of type A and B from consumer to producer. The table depicts the game when the
consumer has both kinds of token(s), at least one each. If the consumer has only one type
of token, Table 2 applies. The shaded cells refer to the restricted game, when the consumer
has no token. The cell corresponding to Sell and Spend uniquely identiﬁes a monetary trade
outcome. Neutral language identiﬁed choices in the experiment. Plain tokens were called
“white tickets” while interest-bearing tokens were called “yellow tickets” (see Instructions
in Appendix B).

The grey area depicts the game if no tokens are held by the consumer.
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Hence, unconditional cooperation and unconditional defection are choices that
are always available to a producer. If the consumer has just one token type
(either A or B), then the stage game is as in Table 2. Table A1 is the natural
extension when the consumer has two token types (A and B). The same direct
mechanism used in the Fiat treatment is retained here.
At the start of a meeting, counterparts see the type of tokens in the counterpart’s possession (not the quantity, to ensure anonymity). Then, both counterparts make simultaneous choices without any prior communication, selecting if
and what kind of token to accept (producer) or oﬀer (consumer). To minimize
the cognitive load, producers are not given the option to sell for a given token
if the consumer does not have that speciﬁc token. Furthermore, two tokens
cannot be oﬀered at the same time, or one after the other. Hence, counterparts do not have the option to attempt another trade if one fails, and ﬁnd an
agreement within that same meeting (for an experiment with this possibility,
see Camera et al., 2016). If the choices are compatible with monetary exchange, then the token is transferred and cooperation occurs. Otherwise, the
default outcome is no transfer of token and no cooperation. As an example, if
a producer asks for token A from a consumer who has A and B tokens, and the
consumer oﬀers token B, then the outcome is defection and no token transfer.
At the end of the meeting, players see the outcome, are reminded of their own
action, and are informed of the counterpart’s action; this facilitates coordination on a mutually compatible strategy as players can understand the reason
for a failed token exchange, and can see what token (if any) was selected by
the counterpart. Results from previous periods in the supergame are always
visible at the bottom of the screen.
Experimental procedures: The experiment was conducted at the Economic Science Institute’s laboratory at Chapman University and involved 504
undergraduate students that were recruited between 4/2017 and 4/2019. We
ran 3 sessions per treatment, each with 24 participants all of whom had previous experience with a game similar to this one, but without tokens; participation in this earlier experiment varied from two months to two years earlier.
Treatments have variation in self-reported sex composition between 29 and 48
percent males (average is 41%). At the session start, players were informed
that only one of the ﬁve supergames completed would be randomly selected
for payment, with public random draw at the end of the experiment. The
points earned in that supergame would be converted into dollars according
to a pre-announced conversion rate of USD 0.15. On average, participants
were paid USD 27, including a show-up fee of USD 7 and the payoﬀ from an
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incentivized quiz on the instructions that was taken before the start of the
experiment. The average duration of a session was 1 hour and 20 minutes.
Instructions were recorded in advance and played aloud at the beginning of
a session, participants had the possibility to follow on individual copies. We
used neutral language for the instructions (words like “cooperation” or “help”
were never used). The experiment was programmed using the software z-Tree
(Fischbacher, 2007). No eye contact was possible between participants. We
collected demographic data in an anonymous survey at the end of each session.

A.2

Proof of Proposition 2

Consider economies with unit-token endowments and the start of any round
t ≥ T , without loss of generality. In equilibrium trade is possible in all meetings, but this may not be true oﬀ equilibrium, in which case the actions prescribed by the monetary strategy are clearly a best response. We must show
that in equilibrium it is optimal for the producer to “sell” and for the consumer
to “spend.” To do so we consider unilateral one-time deviations by producer
and consumer, on the equilibrium path.
Producers do not deviate in equilibrium Here we show that the producer optimally chooses “sell” if she is suﬃciently patient. We calculate oﬀequilibrium payoﬀs using recursive arguments, given that the monetary trade
strategy is history-invariant. A deviator’s oﬀ-equilibrium payoﬀ is largest when
the deviation only alters the tokens’ distribution for one round (the round after
the deviation occurs). This is so because in this case players re-coordinate on
equilibrium play very quickly after the deviation occurs. Given this assumption, we obtain a suﬃcient condition for monetary equilibrium.
Producer i has an incentive to cooperate in exchange for a token if
d + β[d − l + βvp (0)] < vp (0 = a + β[u + g + βvp (0)],
which holds whenever β ≥ β ∗ (u). To interpret the inequality note that we are
considering the best-case scenario for the deviator, when the producer’s initial
defection pushes the distribution of tokens oﬀ equilibrium only in round t + 1.
She defects in t, which gives her payoﬀ d instead of a, but she does not get
a token. In t + 1 she reverts back to following monetary trade, but now she
is a consumer without money. Here, the token distribution is oﬀ equilibrium.
Since everyone else also follows the monetary strategy, the outcome of her t+1
meeting is D and she earns d − l. In t + 2, the deviator is again a producer
without money. In the best-case scenario, in t + 2 she meets a consumer with a
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token and so does every other producer. This best-case scenario occurs when
the deviator meets her victim consecutively in two rounds, t and t + 1. If so,
in t + 2 the tokens’ distribution is back at equilibrium as all consumers have
a token and producers have none. See the illustration in Table A2.
Table A2: The distribution of tokens oﬀ-equilibrium (best-case scenario)
t=1
t=2
t=3
...
Initial producers
producer consumer producer . . .
deviator
0
0
0
...
other player
0
1
0
...
other n − 2 players
0
1
0
...
Initial consumers consumer producer consumer . . .
initial victim
1
1
1
...
other player
1
0
1
...
other n − 2 players
1
0
1
...

Notes: The columns identify the player’s role on a speciﬁc date. At the start of the game,
initial producers have no tokens and initial consumers have one token each. This distribution
corresponds to the equilibrium tokens distribution in any of the subsequent periods. The
deviator is an initial producer who performs a one-time deviation in t = 1 by choosing D,
and follows the monetary strategy thereafter. Oﬀ-equilibrium token holdings in t = 2 are
in bold. The shaded cells identify who is in the match with the deviator in rounds t = 1, 2.
In the best-case scenario, the deviator and her victim meet also in t = 2, which limits the
spread of the deviation and brings the tokens distribution back to equilibrium in t = 3.

For the parameters selected, we have β ∗ (u) = 0.55, 0.50, 0.46, 0.43 for, respectively u = −1, 0, 1, 2.
It should be clear that oﬀ equilibrium if everyone follows the monetary
strategy, then choosing D is a dominant action.
Consumers do not deviate in equilibrium. If tokens have no or a negative ﬂow payoﬀ, then spending them is optimal for a consumer in monetary
equilibrium. This also holds if u > 0. To see this, consider the best case scenario in which the deviation of the consumer moves the distribution of tokens
oﬀ equilibrium for just one round. A consumer with a token has an incentive
to trade it for a good if
u + d − l + β[u + d + βvc (1)] < vc (1) = u + g + β[a + βvc (1)],
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which always holds because u < l and g > 2d by assumption. To interpret
the inequality, defecting in t gives payoﬀ u + d − l (instead of u + g) to the
deviant consumer; she enters t + 1 as a producer with money and reverts back
to following monetary trade. The round after deviating, she is a producer
with a token; hence, she chooses D, as speciﬁed by the monetary strategy. In
the best-case scenario, in t + 1 the deviator meets the person who suﬀered
from her initial defection. If so, in t + 2 the tokens’ distribution is back at
equilibrium: all consumers have a token and producers have none. It follows
that in equilibrium, refusing to spend a token is suboptimal for a consumer.

A.3

Measuring economic performance

Proﬁts are the points earned ex-post by a participant in the average round of
a supergame. Proﬁt excludes beneﬁts or penalties from holding tokens (their
distribution does not impact eﬃciency) and depend on the player’s cooperation
rate c ∈ [0, 1], i.e., the relative frequency of cooperation as a producer, and
the average frequency of cooperation C of the producers met.20 Given role
alternation, proﬁt is (approximately) the average payoﬀ in two consecutive
rounds:
1
π(c, C) := [3 + (1 − c)6 + 12C] .
2
A consumer earns at least 3 points. A producer who cooperates gets 0, and
6 points otherwise—the term (1 − c)6. A consumer earns 12 points when
the counterpart cooperates—the term 12C. Hence, proﬁt ranges from 1.5 to
10.5, is 7.5 points in the eﬃcient outcome (c = C = 1) and 4.5 points in
autarky (c = C = 0). The diﬀerence between average proﬁt in the economy
and autarky proﬁts is realized surplus, and can be at most 3 points. Dividing
realized surplus by its theoretical maximum gives realized eﬃciency, which is
proportional to the average cooperation rate in the economy: it goes from 0%
in autarky, to 100% under eﬃcient play.

A.4

A measure of liquidity value of tokens

This section calculates a rough measure of the liquidity value of tokens in
three treatments, Fiat, Penalty and Reward.21 This liquidity value is an
20

Let ct = 1 denote a cooperative outcome for a player who is a producer in period t (0,
if defection). Let tp be the number of periods in which this player was a producer in
∑tp
the supergame. The cooperation rate for this player is t=1
ct /tp ∈ [0, 1]. A cooperative
outcome can occur either with a unilateral transfer or a monetary trade.
21
I thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this additional analysis.
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indirect ﬂow payoﬀ, the diﬀerence between the income expected by a consumer
entering a meeting with some tokens as opposed to none. Consider Table 8.
To calculate the value of liquidity, consider the value of having some token
in the next round (1 or more) as compared to none (for a current producer).
Let pij denote the probability of meeting a producer with j = 0, 1+ tokens,
conditional on being a consumer with i = 0, 1+ tokens. So, pi0 +pi1 = 1, which
can be calculated from Table 8. Let cij denote the probability of cooperation
in that meeting (the number in parentheses in the Table).
The expected value to a producer, from entering the next round with 0 or
some tokens can be calculated as follows:
vi = 3 + (pi0 ci0 + pi1 ci1 ) × 12,

i = 0, 1 + .

Here 3 refers to the points a consumer earns for sure, and 12 are the extra
points earned if the producer cooperates. This cooperation is uncertain due to
uncertainty in strategy selected by the various counterparts. Recall also that
holding a token might generate direct ﬂow payoﬀs, but these are not included
in the liquidity value of the token.
The liquidity value of tokens can be broadly deﬁned as the diﬀerence between having 0 or 1+ tokens. That is the (indirect) ﬂow payoﬀ v1+ − v0 in this
simpliﬁed calculation. Using the relative frequencies and cooperation rates in
Table 8. we obtain the following expected values, by treatment:
Table A3: Liquidity value of tokens.
Treatment
Penalty
Fiat
Reward

v0

v1+

6.24 7.84
6.97 11.04
5.23 7.24

Liquidity value
1.6
4.07
2.01

In all three treatments the liquidity value of tokens is positive, as we should
have expected given that tokens are accepted by some players in all treatments.
Interestingly the liquidity value of tokens doubles when u = 0 as compared
to u = −1, 1 where monetary trade was infrequent. This rough calculation
qualiﬁes the conclusion that tokens without direct ﬂow payoﬀs (i.e., no interest
payments) are best-suited to support monetary exchange because they have
the largest liquidity value in the experiment.
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